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Method and evidence: Gesture and iconicity in the evolution of language? 
 
Abstract: The aim of this paper is to mount a challenge to gesture-first hypotheses 
about the evolution of language by identifying constraints on the emergence of 
symbol use. Current debates focus on a range of pre-conditions for the emergence of 
language, including co-operation and related mentalising capacities, imitation and tool 
use, episodic memory, and vocal physiology, but little specifically on the ability to 
learn and understand symbols. It is argued here that such a focus raises new questions 
about the plausibility of gesture-first hypotheses, and so about the evolution of 
language in general. After a brief review of the methodology used in the paper, it is 
argued that existing uses of gesture in hominid communities may have prohibited the 
emergence of symbol use, rather than ‘bootstrapped’ symbolic capacities as is usually 
assumed, and that the vocal channel offers other advantages in both learning and 
using language. In this case, the vocal channel offers a more promising platform for 
the evolution of language than is often assumed.  
Word count: 9992 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In recent years there has been an increasingly wide acceptance of the idea that  
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gestures played a significant role in the evolution of symbolic language (Arbib et al.  
2008; Arbib 2005; Fay et al. 2013; Tomasello 2008; Corballis 2003, 2009; Sterelny 
2012a). In particular, it has been hypothesized that the first (proto-)linguistic systems,  
with fairly small vocabularies and little to no grammar, were either exclusively, or  
primarily, gestural in nature. The use of vocalisations is argued to have come late on 
the scene, and taken over from gestures because vocalisations ‘free up the hands’, 
allow for communication in the dark or in dense forests, and so on.  
 
Perhaps the most convincing evidence for gesture-first hypotheses comes from 
research on primate communication and physiology1. It is claimed that primate 
vocalisations are automatic expressions of emotion, with no intentional vocal control 
(e.g. Tomasello 2008; Sterelny 2012a). The primate vocal tract is also very different 
to that of modern humans. Non-human primates can produce a much smaller range of 
sounds, so have limited expressive capacity. It is claimed that they cannot control 
their breathing which is essential to speech, and they also have little to no capacity for 
vocal learning (Fitch et al. 2013; Fitch, 2000). Both in terms of the apparent lack of 
top-down control of vocalisations, and in terms of existing physiology, the vocal 
channel seems to provide a poor evolutionary platform for linguistic communication.  
 
In contrast primates have intentional control of hand and body movements, 
and already use gestures in reasonably flexible ways to communicate (Genty et al., 
2009; Hobaiter & Byrne, 2011; Liebal et al., 2004; Pika et al., 2005; Roberts et al.,  
2013; Tomasello, 2008). Further, since imitation learning was likely important in 
                                                        
1
 This research makes it possible to make a case for gesture-first hypotheses without 
relying on controversial mirror-neurons (Cook et al. 2014; Heyes, 2010a, 2010b), and 
is perhaps best developed by Tomasello and Sterelny. 
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early hominid populations, memory for sequences of hand movements could have 
already been the target of selection2. So, based purely on an assessment of the 
available platforms for language, gestures looks like the best bet (Arbib et al., 2008; 
Arbib, 2005; Corballis, 2003, 2009; Fay et al., 2013; Sterelny, 2012a; Tomasello, 
2008).  
 
In particular, it has been suggested that the physiological changes required for 
speech are so great (and costly), and that speech requires such fine-grained motor 
control, that the relevant evolutionary pressures could only have come from an 
existing, and potentially fairly complex, gestural system of communication. As 
Sterelny (2012a) notes: ‘We evolved speech as a result of living in a world in which 
communication was already important’ (p. 2143). If one makes the further plausible 
assumption that only a reasonably complex language-like system could have provided 
strong selective pressures for high levels of expressivity and control, then one has an 
argument in favour of the existence of an early gestural language, again, potentially 
fairly complex, which was only later followed by vocal language3.  
 
Another factor is that gesture provides a much better channel than speech for 
generating iconic signs, where the form of the sign ‘resembles’ its meaning. For 
example, a sign can be iconic if it mimics an action that is referred to, if the shape of 
the sign resembles the shape of the referent, or the meaning is somehow otherwise 
obvious (e.g. hands moving outwards for ‘bigger’). By using iconic signs, adults can 
communicate fairly easily in the gestural channel in the absence of shared language 
                                                        
2
 Thanks to Kim Sterelny for this point. 
3
 Though one of course still has to say something about why gesture was largely 
abandoned as the primary modality for delivering semantic content. 
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(Fay et al., 2013). Spatial and temporal features, motion, actions, and objects 
associated with actions can all be represented with gestures, and understood 
apparently without much cognitive effort.  
 
Gesture and iconicity therefore go together in gesture-first hypotheses about 
language evolution; early communication, and then linguistic systems, were made up 
of gestures that took the form of pantomime and iconic signs (Donald, 2001; Sterelny, 
2012a; Tomasello, 2008). Further, it seems plausible that iconic gestures would have 
made it possible for individuals with no symbolic capacities to ‘bootstrap’ themselves 
up into successful symbol and language users; shifting naturally from using iconic 
pantomimic signs to the kind of arbitrary symbols now found in many languages.  
 
There are potential problems with these hypotheses though. First, recent 
research has shown that primate vocalisations are not always automatic and 
unintentional. Primates can inhibit calls, change their timing and duration, and alter 
them according to social contexts and so appear to satisfy criteria for first order 
intentionality (Genty et al., 2009; Pollick et al. 2005; Salmi et al. 2013; Schel et al. 
2013; Seyfarth & Cheney, 2010; Slocombe et al., 2010), and at least gorillas seem to 
have some (limited) control over their breathing and vocal apparatus (Clark & 
Perlman, 2014). In this case, the primate vocal channel may not provide such a poor 
platform for the evolution of language as is often made out.  
 
There is also further room to question the assumption that the physiological 
changes required for speech could only have been selected for in the context of an 
existing gestural linguistic system. Vocal sounds are already used to communicate in 
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non-human primates, and may have played other roles in hominid societies too. For 
example, it has been suggested that music, or music-like communication, also played 
various roles in social bonding or displays in hominid groups (Dunbar 1998; Falk, 
2009; Fitch, 2005; Mithen, 2005; and see Ackermann et al., 2014 for 
neurophysiological support). While not endorsing any of these hypotheses in 
particular, they at least show that there are no conclusive reasons to think that the 
physiological and other changes required for speech could only have occurred in the 
presence of an existing gestural language, that for some reason was no longer 
sufficient for communicative needs, rather than resulting from some other set of 
cumulative effects.  
 
Second, and the topic of this paper, there is research that suggests that the 
gestural channel may be at a disadvantage compared to the vocal channel when it 
comes to enabling individuals to understand and learn symbols. Symbolic capacities 
are rarely discussed in debates over language evolution, despite being a prerequisite 
for language use and language learning (Deacon, 1998 is a rare and controversial 
exception). Presumably, this is because a range of animals can be taught to use 
symbols, but don’t have much motivation to communicate, hence the focus on social 
aspects of communication and co-operation. However, there are factors that make 
symbol use and symbol learning easier or harder, and which may serve to place 
significant constraints on the contexts or modalities in which symbol use can emerge, 
even for groups where co-operative communication is the norm.  
 
So, for instance, it is often suggested that since gestures were likely already so 
widely used by hominids (e.g. for communication, teaching skills), they could also be 
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used as (iconic) symbols. However, the findings discussed below strongly suggest that 
it is easier to treat something as a symbol when it is not already the target of fairly 
specific, important, or automatic processing. That is, the preponderance of gestures 
and their many important roles in hominid lives may have made it harder, not easier, 
to treat them as symbolic. There is also evidence that learning mappings between 
symbols and objects is easier when visual attention can be fixed on the referent only, 
and not, for example, split across both the referent and a gesture. So, while gestural 
communication was (and still is) important, using and learning symbols may be far 
easier in the vocal channel. In this case, there is room to question whether iconic 
gestures played a positive role in the transition from non-symbolic communication to 
symbolic language, and more generally, whether linguistic symbols first emerged in 
the gestural channel.  
 
However, while the aim here is to challenge the intertwined roles of iconicity 
and gesture in the evolution of language as found in gesture-first hypotheses, it is not 
to rule these hypotheses out entirely. The arguments made here suggest at least an 
earlier transition from gestural to vocal language than usually assumed, and highlights 
the need for more fine-grained analyses of the relationship between symbolic 
capacities and other features of language and communication. With other evidence 
and arguments this work could contribute to an argument for a vocal-first trajectory, 
but it is not attempted here. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Gesture-first hypotheses are described more 
fully in Section 2. Section 3 will outline some methodological constraints on using 
developmental and other evidence to evaluate evolutionary hypotheses. Research on 
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human infants’ use and understanding of iconicity is briefly reviewed in Section 4, 
and then used as a foil in a longer discussion of infants’ interpretation of gestures in 
Section 5. Section 6 presents a general set of constraints on successful symbol use, 
along with a discussion of how these interact with different communicative 
modalities. In Section 7 a brief overview of interactions between modality and symbol 
learning is presented, and linked to a general advantage for vocal over gestural 
languages. These discussions are summarized in Section 8, and Section 9 concludes. 
 
2. Signs to Symbols with Gesture? 
 
The target question that many gesture-first theorists are interested in is how language, 
as a symbolic communication system, got going in the first place. Many animals 
communicate with signs, where the signs co-vary and are physically associated with 
the presence of their referent, and only refer in the here and now. However, humans 
do something different; they use symbols. Symbols are ‘stimulus independent’ so 
denote rather than co-vary with their referents, and can be used to refer to the 
elsewhere and elsewhen4.  
 
In the Cultural Learning approach to language evolution (Tomasello, 2008), 
the evolution of basic theory of mind (understanding of others’ mental states), co-
operation, and the kind of cognitive ‘de-coupling’ that comes with teaching others by 
rehearsing and exhibiting actions offline (Sterelny, 2012a), create the cognitive 
                                                        
4
 There is clearly a vast amount more to say about what linguistic symbols are, and 
how they differ from the signs found in animal communication systems, but the 
present brief formulation will do for now. It will become more obvious throughout the 
paper what being a symbol user amounts to, in particular in terms of the cognitive 
capacities and learning mechanisms involved in symbol use. 
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platform for symbolic communication. Hurford (2007) has also argued for the crucial 
role of conceptual knowledge and episodic memory in making it possible to share 
meanings at all. Once you have hominids who share a lot of common ground (shared 
background) and are set up to understand communicative intentions, you have 
hominids who seem set up to easily comprehend iconic (gestural) signs, and later 
iconic symbols. Adults, after all, communicate with iconic signs and symbols and 
pantomime fairly easily, providing there is enough context to make it obvious what 
kind of things one might want to communicate about. 
 
So, the standard picture, both implicit and explicit in gesture-first theories, 
goes something like this. First, there is chimp-like gestural communication with signs, 
then once the cognitive platform outlined above has evolved sufficiently (for other 
purposes), pointing, pantomime and perhaps other iconic gestural signs start to be 
used, transitioning to iconic symbols over time. Again, iconicity plays a crucial role 
here, since ‘[e]ven for minds adapted to language and to modern human life—even 
for minds that can use arbitrary, purely conventional symbols— iconicity is 
advantageous. Presumably, it is easier to remember or to recognize iconic signs’ 
(Sterelny 2012a, p. 2144). Via processes of conventionalization, these iconic symbols 
change to arbitrary (non-iconic) symbols over time (on how this shift works and why 
it is beneficial for large vocabularies, see Gasser, 2004; Monaghan et al., 2014). 
Given the significant adaptive advantages of using language, and the apparent 
advantages of the vocal channel over the gestural channel, strong selective pressures 
then act on the vocal channel to turn it into the main channel for carrying semantic 
content.  
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However, while enculturated and some captive chimps point, the use of 
pantomime and iconic gestures to communicate is a missing link. Non-human 
primates rarely, if ever, pantomime communicatively, and what look like iconic 
gestures instead seem to be short-hand versions of actions. These result from the 
process of ontogenetic ritualization, where over time sequences of actions become 
shorter and can be used to prompt a conspecific to complete a standard interaction. 
These gestures can include begging gestures, raised arms to indicate a desire to be 
picked up, grabbing but with little force to initiate play, and so on (Halina et al., 2013; 
Liebal & Call, 2012). These gestures can look iconic to human observers, but do not 
serve as iconic gestures for their users. That is, the gestures are not understood via 
recognition of a similarity relation between the gesture and its meaning, but function 
instead as ritualized, short-hand ways of triggering an action, and can be fairly unique 
to interacting dyads (e.g. mothers and offspring). The cognitive capacities driving 
successful communication in the chimp case are very different to those involved in 
communication via iconicity. 
 
There are also likely to be limitations on the kind of pantomimes that ‘make 
sense’ to early hominids. Pantomimes of human actions seem more likely to be 
understood than pantomimes of an animal’s behavior that is based on a different body 
plan. As noted in Tomasello et al. (1999), to understand a pantomime of a bird 
flapping its wings, one ‘must effect some kind of iconic mapping of wings to arms’ 
(p. 581). Pantomimes of birds and perhaps other prey animals require one extra 
cognitive step in order to be understood, and so may not be among the first set of 
gestural symbols. However, despite these problems, the gestural channel does seem 
like a serious contender because of its potential ability to bootstrap communication 
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from fairly simple signs, relying on existing domain-specific capacities (e.g. action 
understanding) as well as basic theory of mind (understanding of communicative 
intentions), to more general, complex and abstract symbolic communication.  
 
3. Methodology 
 
Questions about language evolution are now often regarded as requiring multi-
disciplinary approaches. The evidence used in this paper to challenge gesture-first 
hypotheses comes mainly from developmental and comparative studies of symbolic 
capacities, but as this is often deemed to be particularly problematic, this section 
outlines the ways that the evidence is used to try to allay some of these worries. 
 
The major concern in using developmental evidence is in avoiding the 
ontology/phylogeny fallacy. Here, this stems from the fact that contemporary 
language change and language learning tracks features of fully language-ready 
contemporary humans, and that this may have little in common with the evolution of 
language and the cognitive systems of pre-linguistic hominids. That is, development 
trajectories may have very little in common with evolutionary trajectories. There are 
however several responsible ways to use developmental evidence, sketched below.  
  
One way that developmental psychology can contribute to evolutionary 
hypotheses is by essentially being embedded in psychological research more 
generally. That is, developmental psychology offers a source of evidence that, with 
others (particularly comparative psychology), can be used to isolate and differentiate 
cognitive capacities that might otherwise be thought to run together, describe how 
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cognitive capacities can be graded, and can be used to illustrate how different 
cognitive capacities interact. In particular, as used in this paper, this can be used to 
challenge common assumptions about what kind of tasks are cognitively ‘easy’ or 
more basic in both developmental and evolutionary terms.  
 
For example, debates about the development of theory of mind serve to 
pinpoint which specific tasks really do require mentalising (attributing and reasoning 
about mental states) and which do not, and what other processes can generate 
complex social behaviours that seem to (but do not) rely on mentalising (Baillargeon 
et al., 2010; Heyes, 2014a, 2014b; Senju et al., 2011). Along with comparative 
research on non-human primates, this can be used to inform hypotheses about the 
evolution of theory of mind such that they are sensitive to subtle differences in 
cognitive capacities and the kinds of cues they rely on, and that identify precisely 
what kinds of tasks, situated in a particular ecological or social scenario, that 
mentalising is really necessary for. 
 
Relatedly, developmental psychology, along with comparative studies of 
animal cognition, can also be used to make reasonable guesses about some of the 
cognitive capacities of early hominids, such as what kind of domain general learning 
capacities they may have had. For example, developmental and comparative research 
provides good reason to think that early hominids had the capacity to fast-map 
associated items (discussed in more detail below).  
 
With background information on the distinctions between cognitive capacities 
and their interrelations, as well as reasonable guesses on the domain general 
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capacities that early hominids had, it is possible to place constraints on evolutionary 
hypotheses. So for example, research on symbolic capacities can be used to identify 
constraints on the ways that symbol use is likely to have emerged; in particular here 
on the modality that is most likely to support the emergence of symbols. It is fully 
acknowledged that these constraints are one set among many, but these constraints 
may be reasonably strong; while symbol learning is now accompanied by dedicated 
cultural and social scaffolding which can help overcome cognitive limitations, 
hominid language learners would not have had access to this. In this case, their 
cognitive features, perhaps particularly those related to symbol use, could have had a 
significant impact on the form of early linguistic systems. 
  
4. Comprehension of Iconic Symbols by Pre-Linguistic Individuals  
 
The argument starts with the weakest evidence. The general finding briefly reviewed 
below is that iconicity (where the form of a sign or symbol resembles its meaning, 
such as pantomimed actions) plays very little or no role early language acquisition or 
comprehension in human infants (both hearing and deaf). This is inconsistent with at 
least a simplistic prediction from gesture-first hypotheses; that if the recognition of 
iconicity is claimed to be cognitively ‘easier’ than the use and comprehension of 
symbols, then one might expect this to be true of developmental sequences. This is 
liable to be dismissed according to the ontogeny/phylogeny fallacy noted above, but 
the evidence reviewed below provides a useful foil to subsequent discussions about 
the relationship between iconicity and symbolic capacities in an evolutionary setting. 
 
4.1 Hearing Infants 
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Children point a lot to communicate with others, but iconic gestures appear to come 
late on the scene in language acquisition. For example, children’s use of pointing 
predicts their rate of acquisition of nouns, but their use of an iconic gesture to 
represent a verb comes six months after they have successfully learned the word for 
the verb (Ozcaliskan et al., 2013). Children are also no better at matching quantity to 
iconic signs (numbers of fingers) than to arbitrary signs (number words), when asked 
to give someone a number of objects, or to indicate how many objects are present 
(Nicoladis et al., 2010). More generally, Namy (2001) found that children could map 
arbitrary words, gestures, non-verbal sounds and pictograms to referents equally well, 
and in (Namy et al., 2004) infants at the early stages of symbolic development (18 
month olds), mapped iconic symbols just as well as arbitrary symbols. It seems as 
though any symbol, embedded in an obvious naming routine can be learned just as 
easily; iconic symbols show no advantage. 
 
Finally, Namy (2008) investigated the ability of infants to recognize iconicity, 
that is, to understand the meaning of iconic symbols based on the recognition of 
resemblance relations between the symbol and its meaning (again, these relations 
could be ones of mimicry of actions, or similarities between perceptual features of the 
symbol and its referent). She found that recognition of iconicity only emerges 
robustly around age 2 (Tolar et al., 2008 find that recognition of iconicity only 
stabilizes at 3 years old). So, recognition of iconicity comes online after, not before, 
the emergence of symbolic development, so it seems that at least for contemporary 
human infants ‘symbolic insight does not originate in or rely upon iconicity’ (Namy, 
2008, p. 845). 
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4.2 Deaf Infants 
A similar picture arises from work on the acquisition of sign language. Unlike most 
vocal languages, iconicity is fairly prevalent in sign languages (Perniss et al., 2010; 
Taub, 2000; Vermeerbergen, 2006), so deaf infants get a significant amount of input 
in the form of meaningful iconic gestures. Yet again here iconicity plays very little 
role in language acquisition. The degree to which a sign resembles its referent does 
not predict its age of acquisition (Orlansky & Bonvillian, 1984). Signs that are highly 
iconic yet also highly morphologically complex (e.g. ‘to give’, where both hands 
move away from the body and open) are learned late, not early (Meier, 1987), and 
phonological complexity and motor constraints seem to trump any effects of iconicity 
in gesture production (Meier et al., 2008).  
 
So, even for languages where iconicity is a major feature, it does not seem to 
play a positive role in language acquisition. Accordingly, in their review of gesture’s 
role in language, Goldin-Meadow and Alibali (2013) state that ‘the iconicity found in 
a sign language does not appear to play a significant role in the way the language is 
processed or learned’ (p. 270). 
 
5. Default Interpretations of Gesture 
 
From the evidence briefly reviewed above, recognition of iconicity does not appear to 
precede the development of symbolic capacities in modern infants. However, as noted 
earlier, this may well just illustrate an ontology/phylogeny difference. Modern 
humans have undergone a large amount of biological evolution, and language 
learning is now heavily socially scaffolded, so what is easy for human infants (e.g. 
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symbol learning) may not be what was easier for hominids (e.g. perhaps recognition 
of iconicity). 
 
However, related work on infants’ understanding of symbols poses more 
serious worries about iconic gestures and their interaction with symbolic and other 
capacities. The work reviewed below also challenges some of claims made by Namy 
about the range of signals that infants readily accept as symbolic, as it seems that 
iconic gestures are not usually treated as symbols, and perhaps not as iconic, after all. 
Importantly, the ability to treat iconic gestures (particularly pantomimed actions) as 
symbols may be fairly hard in cognitive terms, and in ways that are relevant to the 
cognitive capacities and communicative contexts of early hominids. If this is the case, 
then it is less plausible that iconic gestures bootstrapped symbolic capacities in these 
individuals.  
 
5.1 Iconic Gestures and Activity Schemas 
The original hypothesis that infants treat iconic gestures differently to other potential 
symbols was developed in Tomasello et al. (1999). In one of the experimental 
manipulations used in this study, infants were asked to select an object by an 
experimenter, where the required object was represented by a gesture. The gestures 
were often pantomimes of actions that one could perform with or on the object, or 
were otherwise highly iconic, and so assumed to be easy to comprehend. Sometimes 
the infant had previously observed the gesture being modeled with the appropriate 
object (e.g. hammering action with a hammer), but sometimes not. The authors found 
that older infants (over 35 months) could pick out the right object both when they had 
seen the iconic gesture being used with the object before, and when it was a novel 
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iconic gesture. In contrast, younger infants (18 and 26 months old) could pick out the 
right object only when they had previously seen the gesture paired with the object. 
That is, younger infants could not spontaneously pick out an appropriate referent for a 
novel gesture based on its iconic properties.5  
 
This suggests an initial deflationary account of what is going on when young 
infants respond to iconic gestures (here, mainly pantomimes of actions). The idea is 
that infants are not learning symbol-referent pairings via iconicity (resemblance 
relations between symbol and meaning), but are learning about ‘activity schemas’ or 
‘action schemas’ that include both an action and an object (e.g. hammering actions go 
with hammers). When a schema is activated by a gesture, such as pantomimed 
hammering, the infant is able to associate it with the right object because they have 
observed this pairing before. Iconicity is playing no role here though; there is no 
interpretation of the gesture as ‘resembling’ an object, but just an association in the 
form of an action or activity schema.  
 
5.2 Fast Mapping and Activity Schemas 
Marentette and Nicoladis (2011) tested this idea further to see if children use iconic 
gestures as symbolic ‘labels’, similar to how they use words or signs in sign language, 
or if they understand them via activity schemas as outlined above. They did this by 
seeing how well 2-4 year olds could ‘fast-map’ objects to words, arbitrary gestures 
and iconic gestures. Fast-mapping is an exclusion-based form of associative learning 
hypothesized to be used in language learning. Roughly, the idea of exclusion learning 
                                                        
5
 Subsequent findings from Striano et al. (2003) show that 26 month olds could also 
do this, but this seemed to be because infants were already very familiar with the 
objects and actions used in the study. 
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is that learners assume that novel symbols always represent novel objects (and vice 
versa), so if faced with a novel object one can exclude all known symbols as possibly 
referring to it (and vice versa). Making this simple assumption means that during the 
course of learning the space of possible mappings between symbols and referents can 
be drastically reduced over time, since the more mappings you know, the more 
mappings you can exclude (for alternative mechanisms see Smith & Yu, 2008; 
Trueswell et al. 2013). Children appear to use fast-mapping to learn symbols in 
natural languages, so the test is to see if they also use fast-mapping to learn gesture-
referent pairings, and so treat (iconic) gestures as symbols. 
 
In Marentette and Nicoladis’s study, children are first introduced to objects 
and the symbols that refer to them, either novel words, arbitrary gestures, or iconic 
gestures, in an explicit naming ceremony (‘this is an X’, etc). At the testing phase, 
infants then have to choose which of two objects a symbol represents. Since the 
experiment includes very few object-symbol exposures, the only way infants can 
make object-symbol mappings, and so succeed on the test task, is using exclusion-
based learning (fast-mapping).  
 
The authors found that arbitrary words were fast-mapped over all ages, 
unsurprisingly, since infants seem to be able to use fast-mapping (or something like 
it) to learn words in natural languages from about 12-13 months onwards. They found 
that fast-mapping of iconic gestures (here, mostly pantomimes of actions) was not as 
good, but got better over age. Again, this may be unsurprising, given that apparent 
recognition of iconicity increases from age 2 years old onwards. The interesting result 
is that fast-mapping of arbitrary gestures was generally poor for children over all 
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ranges, even when the exclusion based strategy was an obvious one (e.g. when they 
already knew the symbol for one of the two objects they had to choose between).  
 
Marentette and Nicoladis’s explanation of these results tracks the previous 
one. They argue that children over all age ranges apply a ‘default interpretation’ to 
actions, in terms of forming activity schemas that link actions to objects. This default 
interpretation is applied to both the iconic and non-iconic gestures used in the study. 
This works as follows. Children faced with iconic gestures try to link the gesture with 
the object to form an activity schema. This isn’t too hard for iconic gestures in the 
form of pantomimes of actions that one can do with/on the object; the mapping is a 
fairly natural one given the affordances of the object. When children are faced with an 
arbitrary gesture, they also try to form an activity schema. However, now the gestures 
now don’t ‘make sense’ as actions that one could do with/on the object; they have 
nothing to do with the affordances of the object. In this case, they fail to construct an 
activity schema, so fail to make any gesture-object mappings. 
 
It is important to note the two things that are not going on here, which should 
also make the hypothesis more clear. First, for younger infants who cannot recognize 
iconicity in gestures (cannot understand the meaning of novel iconic symbols via 
recognition of resemblance relations between gestural symbols and meanings), 
iconicity is clearly not playing a role in linking apparently iconic gestures to objects. 
Instead, they are making simple associations between particular actions and particular 
objects. 
 
Second, none of the infants in the age range studied (2-4 year olds) treated 
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either iconic or arbitrary gestures on a par with other potential symbols, since they 
failed to apply the method of fast-mapping, even when the gestures were presented in 
standard naming routines. This was true even for fairly competent symbol users (4 
year olds). Instead of treating pantomimed actions as symbols, Marentette and 
Nicoladis (2011) suggest that ‘children prefer to interpret gestures as descriptors…as 
providing information about what one can do with an object’ (p. 394). The cognitive 
process of learning about objects and their function through gestures and activity 
schemas is very different to the process of tagging objects with symbolic gestural 
labels. 
 
Indeed, the existence of this default interpretation of gestures via the 
construction of activity schemas should not be surprising when viewed in 
developmental and evolutionary terms. First, it helps on a basic level of object 
categorization, in terms of segregating items into different kinds of tools, raw 
materials, and the like: ‘Attending to the action of objects is an important means by 
which children understand objects and their categorization…’ (Marentette and 
Nicoladis 2011, p. 395).  
 
Second, much has been made of increasing manual skill and tool use as a 
driver for hominid cognitive evolution (for particular relevance to language see e.g. 
Iriki & Taoka, 2012; Stout & Chaminade, 2012; Stout, 2011). The ability to make and 
use tools in particular sequences, and importantly to teach and learn these skills, 
requires a complex set of motor, social and planning abilities. The ability to learn 
from gestures via the construction of activity schemas would seem to play a crucial 
role in these activities, and so be of significant evolutionary importance. Indeed, it is 
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these existing uses of gesture that are supposed to drive the bootstrapping process 
from iconic gestures to symbolic understanding.  
 
However, the problem for gesture-first hypotheses, as discussed below, is that 
given just how default this processing is, it might actually provide a significant 
developmental and evolutionary hurdle to get over, rather than play a positive role in 
the process of bootstrapping symbolic capacities. That is, existing ways of 
interpreting gestures (e.g. via activity schemas) seem likely to prohibit the 
interpretation of gestures as symbols, rather than make it easier.  
 
6. Symbols 
 
The research outlined here comes from DeLoach’s work on symbolic understanding 
in children and her notion of dual-representation (e.g. Deloach 2002, 2004), and 
related work on the use of symbols in the reverse contingency task in primates and 
children (Apperly & Carroll, 2009; Boysen & Berntson 1995; Boysen et al., 1996; 
Carlson et al. 2005). This research suggests that the easiest kinds of symbols to use 
are those that are not obviously related to the referents in particular ways. In 
particular, it suggests that the kind of action-based iconic gestures supposed to play a 
crucial role in language evolution are particularly hard to treat as symbols.  
 
6.1 Dual-Representation 
Deloach’s work focuses on identifying the factors that make it easier or harder for 
children to treat something as a representation or symbol. Experimentally, the 
situation is usually a variant on the following. A child is shown a scale model of a 
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room, and familiarised with the similarities between the scale model and the room it 
represents. Something is then hidden in the scale model and the children have to 
search for it in the room. Despite the apparent simplicity of this task, it is only reliably 
accomplished by children around 3 years old. Children younger than this have 
sufficient spatial skills, and the ability to identify correspondences between models 
and objects (Troseth et al., 2007), but fail at transferring the knowledge of the scale 
model to the room it represents. Some variants aid performance, such as increasing 
the similarity between the model and the room, giving exhaustive instructions, 
practice on easier tasks, while taking these away make the task almost impossible (for 
summary see e.g. Deloach 2002, 2004). Two variants are particularly interesting; 
hiding the model behind a pane of glass and using only a 2-D picture of the model 
also aid performance.  
 
DeLoach’s theory as to what explains this variety in task performance, and the 
relatively late-emerging ability to perform the task, is that children have to achieve 
‘dual representation’. Children are clearly able to represent the scale models as 
interesting objects in their own right, as things that they want to interact and play 
with. But in order to perform well on the task they must also represent the scale model 
as a symbol; as standing in for something else. Children therefore have to represent 
the same thing in two different ways, and this is what they find challenging.  
 
In particular, when the salience of the scale model is increased, making it a 
really interesting object in own right, this seems to make it more difficult to treat it as 
anything else (e.g. a symbol). However, when the salience of the scale model is 
decreased, by putting it behind a pane of glass or showing only a 2D photograph of it, 
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or otherwise making it impossible for children to interact with it, this makes dual 
representation easier, and so makes the task possible. As Deloach (2002) states: ‘To 
achieve dual representation in the first place, a child has to inhibit responding to a 
symbolic artifact exclusively or primarily as an object’ (p. 330). 
 
6.2 Distancing  
Relatedly, experimental work using the reverse-contingency task suggests that some 
kinds of similarity between a sign/symbol and its referent can make it harder to treat it 
as a symbol. This builds on the concept of ‘psychological distancing’ (Sigel, 1970)6. 
This refers to the ability of an individual can detach themselves or their behaviour 
from the immediate context, for example when they can inhibit routine behaviours 
that are elicited by a particular stimulus. Symbols provide one way of generating 
psychological distance between an individual and a stimulus by essentially replacing 
the stimulus with something behaviourally neutral. The factors relevant to generating 
psychological distance, and so functional symbols, are reviewed below.  
 
The reverse-contingency task is used to test the ability of an individual to 
inhibit impulsive behavior, and sometimes extended to test how symbol use can help 
with this. The task is fairly simple; participants are presented with two arrays, one 
with a small number of valued items (e.g. sweets), and one with a larger number of 
the same items. The participant has to point to the array that they don’t want in order 
to get the one they do want, so if they want the larger group of sweets, they must 
point to the smaller group.  
                                                        
6
 There are several related ideas in the literature, e.g. Bickerton’s (2009) notion of 
displacement, Sterelny’s (2012a, 2012b) discussion of the importance of offline 
processing, the relationship between symbol use and mental time travel, and so on. 
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The initial experiments that are relevant here were carried out by Sally Boysen 
and colleagues on chimps (Boysen et al., 1996; Boysen & Berntson, 1995). 
Unsurprisingly, given chimps’ general lack of self-control, they failed at this task over 
hundreds of trials. However, when the arrays were replaced by Arabic number 
symbols (which the chimps had previously been trained with), chimps could suddenly 
successfully complete the task, apparently by creating ‘psychological distance’ that 
allowed the chimps to inhibit their impulsive response:  
 
‘Upon introduction of Arabic symbols, performance increased immediately to 
more optimal levels. This suggests that the animals had in fact acquired implicit 
knowledge of the rule structure of the task, despite the fact that they were unable to 
implement this knowledge with candy arrays as stimuli. Indeed, over counterbalanced 
sessions with symbols and candy arrays, performance shifted immediately from 
significantly above chance with Arabic symbols to significantly below chance with 
candy arrays.’ (Boysen et al. 1996, p. 84) 
 
Similar results have since been found across other primates, including human 
children (Addessi & Rossi, 2011; Albiach-Serrano et al., 2007; Apperly & Carroll, 
2009; Carlson et al., 2005; Evans et al., 2012; Kralik et al., 2002; Murray et al., 2005; 
Vlamings et al., 2006). Again, participants tend to perform badly on the task unless 
some modification of the task is made (e.g. only using a single set of quantities, like 1 
vs. 4 items), or a symbol is used to represent the desired items (sometimes numerals, 
sometimes tokens etc.), and then performance greatly improves. In particular, more 
nuanced versions of this paradigm are useful in establishing just what kinds of 
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similarity can obtain between the ‘symbols’ and the valued items they represent, such 
that participants can use them flexibly and successfully as symbols, and so succeed at 
the task.  
 
For example, Boysen and Yocom (2012) found that chimps still performed 
badly at the task when the sweets were replaced with equal numbers of small rocks. 
For chimps at least, the similarity in quantity prevented them from inhibiting their 
standard behavioural response. This effect was replicated by Addessi and Rossi 
(2011), where capuchins failed the reverse-contingency task using ‘low-symbolic 
distance’ tokens (tokens that corresponded one-to-one with food rewards), but 
succeeded using ‘high-symbolic distance’ tokens (where each token represented a 
different number).   
 
Two of the most detailed studies of the factors relevant to achieving 
‘psychological distance’ with symbols are Apperly and Carroll (2009) and Carlson et 
al. (2005), with 3-4 year old children. Carlson et al. (2005) again found that 
performance on the reverse-contingency task differed with different symbols. Rocks 
(as above) were least effective, followed by dots, and the only significant 
improvement in performance was found when pictures of animals were used as 
symbols (a mouse for lower number of rewards, and an elephant for the larger 
number). Their explanation for these results tracks that offered above: ‘We propose 
that abstract symbols produc[e] psychological distance that enables [individuals] to 
withhold a dominant response’ (Carlson et al. 2005, p. 610). 
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Apperly and Carroll (2009) added to these conditions. Here, the rewards 
consisted of stickers, and the ‘symbols’ were numerals, number words (which many 
children could not read), dots, photographs of the stickers, and sweets (themselves 
obviously desirable). These were used to test whether the psychological distance 
offered by the symbols depended on one of more of the following factors: intrinsic vs. 
goal-specific desirability, and (roughly) childrens’ familiarity of the relationship 
between the symbol and what it represents.  
 
They found that performance was significantly improved in all ‘symbol’ 
conditions, compared to the sticker-only trials, and (differently to the original chimp 
case) that performance improved over trials. Interesting, this occurred for both the 
sweets-as-symbols trials, and for the photograph trials. This suggests that what works 
well as a symbol may depend on the goal of the task, and not on intrinsic desirability 
(e.g. sweets), and that high visual similarity between referent and symbol (here via 
photographs) does not necessarily have an effect.7 Familiarity with the symbol also 
failed to be a significant factor, as both numerals (high familiarity) and number words 
(low familiarity – many could not read them) both aided performance.  
 
In addition, when some symbol conditions, particularly number words, were 
immediately followed by the original, non-symbolic stickers-only condition, (the one 
that non-human primates and children regularly fail at), high levels of performance 
transferred across. That is, having formed and practiced the right strategy in the 
symbol condition (point to the symbol that represents the lower quantity of stickers), 
                                                        
7
 It is important to note that the children in the study recognized photographs as 
representational items. In this case, it may be that visual similarity is not a relevant 
factor in determining how useable a symbol is, but only if participants are already 
aware that it is delivered in an intrinsically representational medium. 
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children were able to immediately continue this strategy when presented with the real 
stickers (point to the smaller group of stickers to get the larger group). The authors 
note that this effect may however be rather short-lived.  
 
Apperly and Carroll’s explanation of these results again follows the idea of 
psychological distancing above; symbols help to block an impulsive response, and so 
give cognitive ‘space’ to formulate and follow another strategy. The immediate 
improvements in performance found in the symbol condition, (i.e. performance is 
significantly better from the first trial onwards), suggests that the formation of a new 
strategy may be reasonably easy to do once an impulsive or routine behaviour can be 
inhibited. The ‘distancing’ that symbols can provide can therefore have a significant 
effect on behaviour even in the absence of advanced cognitive capacities8. 
 
6.3 Gestural Symbols? 
These results and associated concepts stand to pose a general constraint on the 
emergence of symbolic language. First, achieving dual representation, so treating 
something as both an object/thing in its own right and as a symbol, is easier with 
things that lack physical salience and do not invite interactions. Second, 
‘psychological distance’ between a symbol and a referent is easier to achieve when 
the symbol does not elicit an impulsive behaviour. What both of these accounts have 
in common then is that something can be used as a symbol more easily when it does 
not in itself elicit an impulsive, typical, or otherwise regularised cognitive response.  
 
                                                        
8
 Symbol use also aids performance on delayed-gratification tasks for children, 
chimpanzees and capuchins, but again seemingly only when symbols do not track 
quantity of the reward in a one-to-one manner (Evans et al., 2012). 
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 According to these accounts then, the kinds of things that are least likely to 
form easy-to-use symbols are therefore things that already played important roles in 
the lives of early hominids. These obviously include things that trigger cognitively 
entrenched processes that are crucial for an individual’s development and a 
community’s survival. In particular, iconic gestures that pantomime intentional 
actions are unlikely to fare well as symbols. This is not to deny that action-based 
gestures cannot be used communicatively – clearly they can. It is also likely that 
action-based gestures and pointing, along with elicited responses, can take you fairly 
far in communicative contexts set in the here and now. The difficulty arises in 
situations where one needs to refer to things out of sight, or in the past or future; here 
one needs symbols. And this is where the idea of being able to inhibit routine 
reactions becomes particularly important.  
 
 To illustrate: there are a few uses of gestures deemed to be crucial in the 
evolution of cognition and language, but all depend on eliciting a typical (automatic 
or routinised) response in the here and now. For example, the existing gestural 
communication of non-human primates consists of attempts to elicit a reactive 
behaviour from a conspecific in the here and now in order to complete a standard 
interaction (e.g. a play movement). Second, teaching manual skills using gesture also 
depends on eliciting reactive behaviours, such as imitation, in the here and now. 
Imitation plays a central role in social learning (for review see e.g. Rendell et al., 
2011), and it appears to be a relatively automatic response for human children. Third, 
action-based (iconic) gestures are crucial in learning about intentional actions, about 
objects and what one can do with them, and about manual skills and tool use, mainly 
via the default formation of activity schemas.  
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 Symbol use is necessary to go beyond these automatic or regularised ways of 
communicating set in the here and now. In particular, symbols demand a kind of 
‘distancing’ that enables more flexible responses to be generated. Gestures that 
already elicit a range of cognitively default responses are precisely the sort of thing 
that hominid novice symbol users are likely to have found difficult to treat as 
symbols; they allow no ‘space’ for generating alternative or flexible responses. In this 
case, instead of existing cognitive capacities like action understanding and imitation 
providing a way of bootstrapping symbolic understanding via iconic gestures, they 
may in fact make it harder for symbol use to emerge in the gestural channel. 
 
 It is important to note here that this is a relative claim though; it is not a claim 
that utilising action-based iconic gestures as symbols would have been cognitively 
impossible. Chimps and 3-4 year old children have less executive control and 
inhibitory capacity than adult hominids living in co-operative and reasonably 
technological advanced communities. The claim is instead that turning action-based 
iconic gestures, that already played important roles in hominid communities, into 
symbols, is a great deal (cognitively) harder than usually assumed. If one is looking 
for the easiest path towards developing symbol use, then co-opting action-based 
iconic gestures is not it. 
 
7. Gestures, Symbols and Associative Learning 
 
This next section identifies a very different set of general constraints on language 
acquisition, by looking to exclusion-based associative learning (fast-mapping) again. 
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Before doing so, it is important to note that exclusion-based associative learning is not 
unique to contemporary humans, and so is relevant in this context. Exclusion-based 
learning and reasoning has been found in other primates (Beran, 2010; Call, 2006; 
Lyn & Savage-Rumbaugh, 2000) as well as dogs (Aust et al., 2008; Kaminski et al., 
2004; Pilley & Reid, 2011), so can be treated as a domain general learning 
mechanism available to early hominids. The evidence reviewed below suggests that 
learning mappings between symbols and referents is likely to be easier when the 
symbols are in the vocal/auditory channel, rather than gestural/visual channel. This, 
along with a related advantage of vocal communication, provides corroborating 
evidence to the claim above. 
 
7.1 Single vs. Multi-Modal Learning 
Puccini and Liszkowski (2012) used a similar set-up to Marentette and Nicoladis 
(2011) above to investigate how well 15 month old infants fast-map symbols in the 
vocal and gestural channel separately, and both together. The infants watched films of 
explicit naming events, where objects were either labeled with a word, a gesture, or a 
word plus gesture. Eye-trackers were used to tell whether the infants had successfully 
learned the labels, by seeing which object they attended to when addressed with 
‘Hello, where is the [label]?’. The only relationships that were fast-mapped above 
chance were those between words and objects. In this study, infants failed to fast-map 
gestures and objects, and also failed in conditions where both words and gestures 
together were used to label an object. 
 
The authors note that infants this young are able to learn multi-modally using 
words plus deictic gestures (pointing), but suggest that it is representational gestures 
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(such as pantomime) that they have a problem with. The explanation here is a simple 
one. When presented only with sounds and objects, infants can direct all their visual 
attention to the object, which facilitates mapping the object to its vocal/auditory label. 
When pointing is used as well, the points direct visual attention to the relevant object, 
again facilitating fast-mapping. However, ‘[r]epresentational gestures, by the very 
nature of the visual modality, require that infants divide their visual attention between 
the referent and the gesture’ (Puccini and Liszkowski, 2012, p. 6). Not only are 
infants in the multi-model presentation required to make a three-way association 
(word+gesture+object), but their visual attention is split in two. Even in just the 
gestural presentation, visual attention remains split across the gesture and the object, 
in a way quite unlike the word-only presentation. Word learning may therefore be 
easier in the vocal channel than the gestural channel, purely in terms of lessening the 
demands on visual attention and facilitating associative learning. 
 
7.2 Associative Learning and Language Acquisition 
There is another more general body of work that supports the idea that sustained 
visual attention is crucial to word learning. Smith and colleagues have used head-
mounted cameras to investigate visual attention and its relation to successful world 
learning in infants (for review see Smith, 2013). Over many studies they have found 
that despite the fact that toddler visual experiences are far more dynamic and 
changing than adult worldviews, there are periods where single objects are attended, 
and these are the periods in which successful word learning tends to occur. When 
objects are visually larger, centered in the visual field, and gazed at for a longer 
period, word learning is far more likely (Pereira et al., 2014; Yu & Smith, 2012).  
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These periods of sustained selective visual attention on objects drastically 
reduce referential ambiguity in naming events, essentially by making sure that only 
one object is a contender as a possible referent. Importantly, these processes generate 
ideal periods of learning ‘for free’. As Periera et al. (2014) note, this work shows that 
when visual attention is directed towards a single object:  
 
‘…there are very clean sensory moments when no additional cognitive 
processes would seem to be needed to determine the relevant object… [Therefore] the 
dynamic visual properties of naming events associated with learning versus not 
learning the object name also suggest that there are visual limits on object name 
learning.’ (Periera et al., 2014, pp. 183-184) 
 
When symbols for visually presented objects are presented in the 
vocal/auditory channel, there is no need for mechanisms of attention switching, 
symbols and objects can be presented simultaneously, and so there are periods of time 
when associative learning can proceed fairly easily with no need to invoke complex 
cognitive processes. In contrast, when learning visually presented symbols for 
visually presented objects, learners must switch visual attention between symbol and 
object, which demands a greater amount of sustained selective attention.  
 
It is important to note here that contemporary deaf signers clearly manage to 
fast-map gestures to objects, perhaps by developing greater selective attention or 
making use of socially scaffolded ways of learning, and that their developmental 
trajectory is the same as that of hearing infants. Again, the claim is a relative one; it is 
harder, but not impossible to learn symbol-object mappings when symbols are 
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presented in the gestural/visual channel. But the fact that symbols delivered in the 
vocal/auditory domain come with easy learning episodes for free is important. It 
means that there is a basic modality advantage to vocal/auditory symbols over 
gestural/visual symbols, just in terms of providing a simple way of resolving 
ambiguity in input in order for associative learning to proceed.  
 
7.3 More on Vision 
Finally, a brief note on the advantages and disadvantages of the gestural and vocal 
modalities for communication. One question that faces gesture-first hypotheses is how 
and why languages shifted from the gestural to the vocal modality. Presumably, given 
the assumed poor evolutionary platform that non-human primate vocalisations 
provide, and the costs associated with changes in vocal physiology, there must have 
been massive selective pressures on expanding the vocal platform, given the apparent 
disadvantages of gestural language. However, the explanations for this are not always 
very satisfactory. Languages are used by individuals in a range of environments, and 
different modalities are better or worse for different uses. Gesture seems to win out in 
cases where it pays to be quiet (say in hunting). The usual ways in which vocal 
language is said to offer advantages is in situations where you can’t see (either in the 
dark, or in dense forests etc.), and for freeing up your hands (e.g. using tools, in food 
preparation). So, it is unclear whether switching the delivery of semantic content 
almost entirely from the gestural to the vocal channel can be sufficiently motivated, 
especially if the vocal platform is as poor as is often claimed.  
 
Yet the vocal channel may have another advantage that is not usually raised, 
but is consistent with the research on visual attention above. Further, this advantage 
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may be strong enough that it contributes to the claim that the transition from gestural 
to vocal (linguistic) communication happened at an early, rather than late, stage of 
language evolution. This is that vocal/auditory languages also free up the eyes. 
 
Speakers of vocal/auditory languages often do look at conversational partners, 
but do not always do this, and do not have to in order to communicate. However, 
observing and following signed group conversations is surprisingly exhausting, at 
least for non-native speakers9. Unlike in vocal conversations, all visual attention must 
be focused on the speaker/signer at all times. It is very difficult to do anything else 
that requires vision at the same time.  
 
As evidence for this, eye-tracking studies show that sign language users tend 
to fixate on the face of speakers/signers, both because facial movements convey a 
variety of types of information (emotional, lexical) and because it forms a central base 
for fixation. Peripheral vision is then used to process hand and body movements 
(Agrafiotis et al., 2003; Emmorey et al., 2009; Muir & Richardson, 2005). Muir and 
Richardson (2005) found that when distracting objects were present behind a 
speaker/signer, the percentage of time signers spent looking at them varied between 0-
2%, with most signers never looking at them. Across several videos, the total 
proportion of time participants looked away from the speaker/signer to an 
uninteresting background was 0%. The implication is that in natural signed 
conversations, the total time that signers spend looking away from speakers/signers’ 
faces and bodies is vanishingly small. 
 
                                                        
9
 Even fairly fluent non-native signers report that their eyes get tired well before their 
hands do. 
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This is hardly surprising since all linguistic information in sign languages is 
present in the visual modality, in a fairly small region of visual space, and (at least in 
contemporary sign languages) presented very quickly. Yet the basic fact that the 
direction of gaze during a signed conversation has to remain fairly static places strong 
constraints on the kinds of situations that it is easy to communicate in while using 
gesture. Vocal languages make it easy to communicate while on the move, while 
tracking or looking for things in the environment, while making or manipulating 
things, and anything else where vision is used. In this case, the constraints that 
gestural languages place on what you can look at while communicating (not very 
much) may be another significant reason to utilise the vocal/auditory modality fairly 
early on.   
 
8. Adding it All Up 
 
A number of constraints have been identified above based on research on symbolic 
capacities in particular, which suggest that the vocal, rather than that the gestural 
channel, is more likely to support the emergence of symbolic language. These are 
summarised below. 
 
First, developmental research suggests that there is a cognitively default 
interpretation of gestures. This leads to the construction of activity schemas, where 
objects are associated with actions. These activity schemas can be used in gestural 
communication, and seem likely to have played an important role in hominid 
evolution, particularly in the teaching and learning of manual skill and tool use. Yet 
these gestures are treated neither as symbolic, nor (for younger children) as obviously 
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iconic, even by reasonably competent symbol users (4 year old children). Importantly, 
this default interpretation of gestures applies not only to iconic gestures (e.g. 
pantomimes of actions), but to gestures more generally, so may be a cognitive 
response to any sign made in this modality.  
 
Second, the concepts of dual representation and psychological distance 
explain further why gestures may be difficult to treat as symbolic. According to 
Deloach’s theory of dual representation, treating something as a symbol requires 
representing it in two ways; first, as an object in its own right, and second, as a 
symbol or stand in for something else. Achieving dual representation is made far 
easier when the salience of the object is decreased, thus enabling an individual to 
inhibit their typical responses to it as an object. Relatedly, the concept of 
psychological distance can be used to explore the features of a successful symbol. 
Carlson et al. (2005) and Apperly and Carroll (2009) found that stimuli that do not 
strongly elicit a dominant response towards a desired object are easier to use as 
symbols. These can include stimuli that are not relevant to the current goal (but 
perhaps still desirable), images of the desired object (so long as images are treated as 
representational), existing symbols (numerals) and new or unfamiliar stimuli (images 
of other stimuli, number words). These kind of stimuli do not strongly elicit a (goal 
relevant) response, and allow individuals to respond to them in more flexible ways; 
here as symbols for desired objects. 
 
In general then, a constraint on successful symbol use in both human and non-
human primates, is for the symbol to be a stimulus that does not itself elicit an 
impulsive, routine, or otherwise dominant response. Yet the evidence above on the 
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default interpretations of gestures as part of activity schemas, research on imitation 
and its role in learning, and the nature of primate gestural communication, strongly 
suggests that gestures were already being interpreted and responded to in default and 
routinized ways by hominids. From the point of view of symbolic understanding then, 
gesture does not present the best modality for symbol use to emerge in.  
 
It is also worth reiterating how inhibition is related to symbol use. This is that 
non-symbolic communication, including gestural communication, is likely to be 
sufficient for a wide range of communicative needs in the here and how. And, as 
above, much of this communication may take the form of routinized behavioural 
interactions, or rely on dominant or automatic types of cognitive processing. Symbols 
are needed to expand the range of communication from these routines to something 
more flexible. The specific cognitive processes that serve non-symbolic gestural 
communication do not therefore offer a natural platform for the emergence of 
symbolic language; they are instead the kinds of processes that require a significant 
amount of inhibition in order for symbol use to emerge.   
 
Finally, there are specific properties of the vocal modality that illustrate 
further (though perhaps smaller) advantages over the gestural modality. First, using 
associative learning to map symbols to objects is cognitively easier when symbols are 
presented in the vocal channel, rather than the gestural channel. The reasoning is 
simple: mapping a sound to a visually presented object requires much less control of 
selective visual attention than mapping two visually presented stimuli to each other. 
This is potentially important as symbol mappings were (presumably) initially learned 
slowly and laboriously, and in the near absence of explicit teaching or social 
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scaffolding. In this case, any slight cognitive advantage in the learning process, here 
afforded by the vocal/auditory modality, may make a big difference. Relatedly, vocal 
languages not only free up the hands, but they also free up the eyes. Given that visual 
resources would have been essential in many hominid activities, there may be a 
significant cost associated with decreasing their availability, as is the case when using 
gestural language. 
 
9. Conclusion  
 
The aim here has been to challenge gesture-first theories of language evolution by 
identifying a new set of constraints on the emergence of symbolic language, based on 
the properties of symbolic processing. These constraints are obviously one set of 
many that need to be taken into account in evaluating evolutionary hypotheses, but 
the evidence reviewed above hopefully shows that they are worthy of being included 
in discussion. In particular, these constraints challenge the assumption often found in 
gesture-first hypotheses that existing capacities for generating and interpreting 
gestures could have been easily co-opted for symbolic use; the opposite has been 
argued to be true. In addition to this problem, the advantages of the vocal channel for 
learning and communication lend support to the idea that the vocal modality is not 
such a poor platform for the evolution of symbolic language afterall.  
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